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THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW: A THEOLOGICAL, HUMANISTIC 
VIEW OF LEGAL PROCESS. By Milner S. Ball. Athens: The Univer-
sity of Georgia Press. 1981. Pp. xii, 209. $15. 
Contemporary law, in theory and in practice, has evolved from funda-
mental rationalist premises deeply rooted in the Liberal 1 political tradition. 
Mysticism hitherto has won few adherents among lawyers, judges, or legal 
theorists. Skepticism and at least the pretense of analytical rigor have char-
acterized American jurisprudence. Recent theorists have largely retained 
rationalist assumptions,2 but the foundation of Liberal jurisprudence - of 
belief in law as a check upon rather than an expression of ideology - is 
being shaken by attacks from either flank. From the right, reformers eager 
to reverse the pluralistic consequences of the moral skepticism characteris-
tic of contemporary constitutional jurisprudence seek to retrench the pow-
ers of the federal courts, leaving the field of social regulation to the more 
confident partisans of the political arena.3 From the left, the critical legal 
studies movement claims to recognize the identity oflaw and ideology, hop-
ing to ally judi_cial power with the visionary agenda of the utopian left.4 
In The Promise of American Law, Milner S. Ball raises a more tradi-
tional mystic challenge to the rationalist mainstream of legal thought: Ball 
envisions the unification oflaw and traditional Christian religious doctrine. 
Ball's claim (he himself refers to it as a "wager" rather than an argument) is 
"that the biblical tradition is the most fruitful medium for understanding, 
judging, and celebrating the secular world, including law" (p. 2). 
The author pursues this bold speculation in three principal directions. 
First, he develops a broad theory of law as theater, performed with the 
objective of affirming the transcendent state of the biblical "beginning." 
Second, Ball applies this vision to the concrete proolem of judicial review, 
advancing the defense of powerless minorities mandated by Christian love 
as the justification for that institution. Finally, Ball challenges the tradi-
tional, technical approach to legal education, arguing that this approach 
isolates the law from the moral universe it reflects and shapes. Ball argues 
that even for those who do not join in his faith, the perspective he explores 
can offer "clarification, assessment, and affirmation of what is really going 
on in what is happening to law" (p. 2). To gain this understanding, the 
reader need not "share [the author's] theological premises, only .... grant 
1. Liberal is here capitalized to signify its classic and most general sense. See R. UNOER, 
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 63-100 (1975). 
2. Contemporary legal theory acknowledges varying degrees of political influence, but typ-
ically remains rationalist in its perspective. See, e.g., G. CHRISTIE, LAW, NORMS AND AU· 
THORITY (1982); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); H.L.A, HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); F. HAYEK, LAW, LIBERTY AND LEGISLATION: RULES AND ORDER 
(1973); H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Applica-
tion of Law (unpublished manuscript 1958). 
3. For the flavor of this sort of approach to judicial "reform," see, e.g., A BLUEPRINT FOR 
JUDICIAL REFORM (P. McGuigan & R. Rader eds. 1981). 
4. See, e.g., Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983). 
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them" (p. 3). Unfortunately, the reader cannot grant Ball's assumptions 
without surrendering the rationalist foundation of Liberal jurisprudence. 
I 
Ball begins by rejecting the social contract as the source of legitimate 
authority in American law. According to Ball, a law professor and Presby-
terian minister, the social compact theory fails to account for antecedent 
events (p. 11), and requires individuals to surrender preexisting rights (p. 14). 
Ball exalts instead the biblical beginning - the vertical covenant between 
God and Israel fulfilled for mankind in Jesus Christ. This vertical relation-
ship legitimates authority wherever it is honored because, in Ball's view, it 
is " 'the one fundamental principle for individual regeneration and for so-
cial reformation' " (p. 12). The vertical covenant in turn establishes the ba-
sis for the "horizontal community" of the people themselves. The exact 
meaning of this conception is hidden from rationalists by the mysteries of 
faith, but here is Ball's description: 
In contrast to the social contract, the covenant tradition does not rest on 
a surrender of a preexisting individual power to another entity. The people 
and their power are created by the covenant. To consent is to accept the 
proposition that the people become a people in the election of God. The 
covenant is a matter of receiving, not preserving, the self or its property. 
The attendant duty involves no submission, save that of becoming the peo-
ple that they are. Obedience is not submission to a higher power or greater 
authority but is a response to the present reality that has called the people 
into being. The content of the law is the covenant that creates the people. 
The people are not alienated from their law. It follows that succeeding 
generations are not made party to a mythic compact by implied consent. 
They affirm a contemporaneous covenant by participation in, and accept-
ance of, the identity of the people whom the covenant creates. The cove-
nant thus constitutes the people, and it constitutes them governors. [P. 14.] 
There is surely no coincidence in the intersection of Ball's covenants to 
form a cross. 
The judicial function in such a society is to reaffirm man's covenant 
with God. For Ball, the metaphor o.f the theater ideally models the func-
tion of courts in linking the presenf with the beginning. Judicial theater 
makes many contributions~ "coµununication of nonverbal information, re-
direction of aggression, en6our~gement of impartiality, inducement of crea-
tivity, and the performance qfrwhat the law is" (p. 66). In a legitimate legal 
order - where courts are theaters of justice and not of oppression - the 
abstract legal rules informing the dramatic action incorporate the biblical 
beginning as a backdrop of natural law (pp. 27-28). 
All of this is provocative, but not compelling. To begin with, resting the 
authority of the Constitution on theological musings strains against a great 
deal of the Constitution itself. 5 In an odd concession to secular values, the 
author admits that all faiths (presumably including atheism) can participate 
in the religious understanding of the Constitution, since "diversity is in 
keeping with the beginning and should be encouraged" (p. 28). The reader 
5. See, e.g. , U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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is left to ponder the elements "in keeping with the beginning" which should 
be encouraged, such as diversity up to and including blasphemy, and other 
elements such as slavery and torture which should not. 
More fundamentally, mysticism makes bad law. How is Ball to argue 
with one who disputes that the legitimacy of the Constitution rests on reli-
gious grounds? Why should Ball's theology bind those not present at "the 
beginning," when he grants that they enjoy antecedent rights? A generation 
ago, the claim that moral legitimacy inhered in the abstract form of legal 
rules fell before a devastating critique.6 Why should the claim that idiosyn-
cratic structures of belief invest law with morality prove any more persua-
sive? The truth assumed is easiest to see. 
II 
Ball's discussion of judicial review suffers from the same shortcoming: 
Christian ethics offer one splendid reason for caring about the oppression of 
minorities, but that conclusion doesn't really address the relevant issues. If 
everybody followed that ethic, the problem of discrimination wouldn't re-
quire judicial intervention. So w!ly are judges more likely to be good 
Christians than legislators? 
Judicial review and the protection of minority rights present issues in 
legal and political theory. Viewing the problems in terms of those disci-
plines, rather than in the mystic light of Ball's theology, recognizes the chal-
lenges of containing political power without attempting to "solve" it by 
assuming normative conclusions millions are unlikely to accept. In the last 
analysis, appeal to religious doctrine seems only remotely tailored to protect 
the powerless from majoritarian politics in which religious doctrine may 
play a major role. 
III 
The Promise of American Law concludes with a discussion of legal edu-
cation. Ball condemns the "ideology of technocracy" that pervades much 
law school teaching, because conceiving the law in technical terms dissoci-
ates legal analysis from social reality. Here, Ball offers a theological varia-
tion on a theme given humanist dimensions by James B. White7 and 
Marxist undertones by Roberto Unger.8 Stripped of independent signifi-
cance, the study of law becomes the study of something else; of religion for 
Ball, of literature for White,9 of ideology for Unger. 10 
Law review commentary, by its nature, cannot place claims about the 
relevance of legal education in perspective. Surely the forms of legal rea-
soning, even as revealed in law school, often conceal less pretentious 
processes. But if modem American judges think they are engaged in reli-
6. See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 61 HARV. L. REV. 593 
(1958). 
7. J.B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION ()973). 
8. See Unger, supra note 4. 
9. See White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 
415 (1982). 
10. See Unger, supra note 4. 
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gion, politics, or literature while pretending to enforce the law, their mas-
querade is consistent, subtle, and altogether more effective than they seem 
capable of bringing off.11 And if the ideal oflegal method has any norma-
tive appeal, the student may well look first to the distinguished scholars 
who have tried to give it substance.12 For those who reject such efforts as 
illusory, and who even in this secular age find visionary theology attractive, 
Ball's book is one alternative. 
l l. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 2, at 138-43 (judges believe themselves bound by clear 
legal rules and would lose their powers if they acted otherwise). 
12. Within the defense of legal method, there is something for almost every ideological 
taste. See, e.g., note 2 supra. 
